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The Monstrous Disability and the Disabled Monster: Jeffrey Jerome Cohen's Seven Monster Theses and Disability Creationism

Abstract

This paper revisits Jeffrey Jerome Cohen's *Monster Theory: Reading Culture* (1996) and maps theories of disability representation onto Cohen's seven monster theses. This connection between Cohen's work and disability is not new, but there is yet to be an explicit chronicle of this relationship. Starting first with the idea that monster films have always been fascinating because, for better or worse, it is the one genre that has been explicit about disability, this paper argues that the horror genre may be the only genre willing to explore disability within a political context. This paper gives specific examples of where to find the monster in popular culture, and how those monsters, despite not being labelled explicitly as disabled, serve to bring discourses of marginalization into mainstream popular culture. Each of Cohen's theses is explained and related both to classic tropes of disability representation as well as possible avenues for addressing more nuanced depictions of disability in future analyses, with the potential to track the monster for notions of inclusion and integration—but also acceptance and fluidity in identity—in real life.

Culture creates monsters that reflect the fears of their society, including fears about disability. Ableism has been incorporated into depictions of monsters since their first appearance. In some cases, disability is used to make monsters seem dangerous, unsettling, or unpredictable. Other times, it's used to give monsters weaknesses that heroes can exploit. In most cases, these representations adhere to stereotypes about what it means to be disabled. A good monster can add to a good story, but ableism can detract from that.

As our culture continues to push for more representation of marginalized communities, we must also make sure that the representation is diverse and not harmful to those communities. When the horror genre only uses disabilities in its attempts to scare its audience, it creates and reinforces a belief that disabled people in the real world are dangerous and scary. Horror and monster films can include disability—I am not arguing that the genres must move away from disability depictions entirely—but they do need to address inequity and compulsory ablebodiedness to authentically include the disability experience. Monsters do not need to exist separately from disability to be anti-ableist.

In his 1996 book *Monster Theory: Reading Culture*, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen presents seven

monster theses that guide scholars on how to read monsters and the cultures they both shape and are shaped by. This paper will examine each of Cohen's monster theses in relation to disability representation in film. This connection between Cohen's work and disability is not new, but there is yet to be an explicit chronicle of this relationship. The theses often parallel the depictions of harmful stereotypes of disability within film, but they also present some liberating notions for disability as an identity category.

Horror films often insist that the scariest thing is having a body that does not behave in the way it is meant to. To be disabled is to be a monster, something to avoid or destroy at all costs. The horror film has always been fascinating because, for better or worse, it is the one genre that has been explicit about disability; it may be the only genre willing to explore disability within a political context. Even while mainstream and popular culture discussions regarding race, class, and gender become increasingly sophisticated, disability is still not treated as a political, social, or structural issue. Understanding disability requires understanding its social construction, and social construction can be read in cultural products.

This paper will break down the monstrous as argued by Cohen and extrapolate how

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each thesis can be used to examine disability depictions in film. While some of the theses will be connected to classical analyses of disability representation, this paper will also explore possibilities for seeing more diverse disability representation through the embodied monster—this representation already exists but is often overlooked. While the monster itself infrequently reflects real, diagnosable disabilities, it does exist as a metaphor for otherness, abnormality, or rejection of the binary, and thus offers possible avenues for situating disability in the real world.

Thesis I: The Monster's Body is a Cultural Body

Cohen's first thesis states that the monster is an embodiment of the cultural moment in which it was created¹. The monster does not and cannot exist without cultural significance; it functions to represent the fears, anxieties, desires, and values of the people within the society. The word *monster* means "that which reveals" and "that which warns"²—it reveals ideologies and warns of threats to their integrity.

As a result of the cultural connotations that are tied to the monster, it exists to be read—requesting critical analysis by its mere presence. Cohen states that "the monstrous body is pure culture"³, meaning that it so precisely parallels its environment that it offers the easiest method of analysis for the culture it exists within. Cohen's first thesis offers opportunities for analyzing disability representation: if we turn to the monster to look at cultural ideology, we can begin to understand how a culture values bodily form and normative identities. In addition to this, we learn about how a culture values these things *over time*; as culture changes, so does the monster. While there is always the fear that representing disability as monstrous will result in audiences fearing disability—I do not deny that this continues to occur in film—I am also aware of the possibilities of the monstrous to aid in following the progression of disability representation and thus disability acceptance.

The monster is a common allegory—more often than not, monsters stand as emblems of a society's cultural focus. Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*⁴ has been turned into countless films that signify the social responsibility of science in the industrial revolution; zombies have typically been interpreted as manifestations of capitalism gone awry like

in *28 Days Later*⁵ or *I Am Legend*⁶; vampires frequently represent the fears of colonialism, like in film adaptations of Bram Stoker's *Dracula*⁷, *The Vampire's Ghost*⁸, or *What We Do in the Shadows*⁹; and kaiju films represent nuclear testing or nuclear hubris in films such as *Godzilla*¹⁰ or *Pacific Rim*¹¹. While none of these films are explicitly about disability, they do represent entities that are characterized in similar ways to the disabled body: stigmatized and atypical bodies, scars, diseases, or medical technology. The monster, like disability, is characterized en masse as misshapen, twisted, broken, deformed, or disfigured. In addition to this, many of the circumstances that create the monster also create disability: colonialism, capitalism, the industrial revolution (or other major changes to economic function), and environmental devastation are all mass disabling events.

Martin Norden states that the way films present cultural values is accepted as "inevitable, normal, and natural rather than as constructs of the culture itself"¹². The monster's body as a cultural body tells us that the disabled body translates into a common denominator of cultural fascination (if not downright obsession). This fascination with the monstrous—a body not functioning in the ways that it is "supposed to"—as a method to define culture infiltrates thinking across discursive registers as a shared reference point in deciding matters of human value and communal belonging. The monstrous body is an easy target for projection, the way different bodies are represented on screen says little about the body itself and more about the cultural context in which it is produced. Thus, the cultural (monstrous/disabled) body in film can serve to highlight the paradox of compulsory ablebodiedness. These representations force us to reconsider why we value a certain standard of ability.

Thesis II: The Monster Always Escapes

The most horrifying thing about the monstrous body is that it is unkillable. In his second thesis, Cohen states that the trick of the monster is that it will immaterialize and vanish, only to reappear somewhere else¹³. No matter how many times Michael Myers in the *Halloween*¹⁴ series is seemingly defeated, he reappears time and time again over the course of almost 50 years of films. The monster's body is both "corporeal and incorporeal"¹⁵—it shows us both what it is like to

inhabit a body and how to live among other bodies—and its largest threat is its propensity to shift.

Norden states that disability representation often falls prey to one of two conclusions: curing the disability or killing the disabled character¹⁶. This is done because disability presents a problem within a narrative arc, whilst its elimination or rehabilitation participates in the story's resolution. Cohen's second thesis offers new readings on the history of disability in film: if the monster *always* escapes, then what does that tell us about the monster we thought we cured or monsters we were sure to kill?

Let's start with the premise that the monster always escapes. If Norden's argument of "cure or kill" is also true, then there must be a way to coalesce the two ideas. In *Cinema of Isolation*¹⁷, he states that society will "act on its fear of Others" by neutralizing them through transformation or condemnation¹⁸. Similarly, Cohen states that each reappearance of a monster is bound in a "double act of construction and reconstitution"¹⁹. Thus, I argue that a culture will cure or kill a specific monster at a specific time, but the fears and anxieties that are tied to that monster "escape." It's not the *physical entity* of the monster that's escaping, but rather the *ideology* that is tied to that monster.

We can see this occur throughout the history of cinema. The monster, much like disability, is often used as a political allegory. If we turn to films that attempt warn us about, say, our desolate future, we see the same narrative appear time and time again. For example, the monster in *Cloverfield*²⁰ warns us of massive environmental destruction; as do the monsters in *C.H.U.D.*²¹, *The Host*²², *The Happening*²³, *Creature from the Black Lagoon*²⁴, *The Crazies*²⁵, *Mimic*²⁶, *Prophecy*²⁷, or *Crimes of the Future*²⁸ among *many* others. These films have different representations of "the monstrous," but they all hinge in some form or another on the premise of ecological destruction. This is not a finite list: while the monster in each film is cured, killed, or condemned, the "idea" of the monster (in this case, ecological fear) continues to return time and time again.

Thus, both Norden and Cohen are correct in their diverging statements. The monster *does* always escape, and the disabled character *must* always be cured or killed. The physical embodiment is not what culture is fascinated by, but what that physical body represents is crucial to identity formation across time and space—the body

can change, but the fears will remain. Different monsters and different disabilities can exist to represent the same cultural and categorical crises.

Thesis III: The Monster is the Harbinger of Category Crisis

The monster appears at moments of cultural crisis—where systematic structuring is already faltering—to threaten and violate the laws of nature that society has established. In the face of the monster, scientific inquiry and its ordered rationality crumble. The monstrous body does not operate the way a body is "supposed to;" society rejects anything but the normative, anything that aligns with what we know. As monsters present themselves as "disturbing hybrids", they can be read as dangerous in Cohen's eyes: "a form suspended between forms that threaten to smash distinctions"²⁹.

Noël Carroll³⁰ states that the monster is an entity that embodies those inconceivable qualities of a being existing between categories, and that embodying them gestures toward conceivability, taking a step toward the rational by making them material. The monster only exists because we created it, and yet, it challenges the very categories that made it real. The monster can only be categorized as a monster if it violates the mutually exclusive categories through which we understand the world: living/dead, human/animal, organic/inorganic, singular/multiple, normal/abnormal, or disabled/nondisabled.

While Carroll identifies this categorical transgression firmly within the body of the monster³¹, Julia Kristeva labels it as abjection³². Contrary to Carroll's monster, Kristeva's account of abjection refuses any such objectification. Abjection transgresses the boundaries between the subject and the object—it opens the boundaries surrounding a body, and it defies limitations. However, with both Carroll and Kristeva's diverging characterizations, the structural importance of monsters remains, even as the nature of "monstrosity" has fluctuated.

Disability representations essentially function as Carroll's monster or Kristeva's abjection. Disability studies has more than covered the transgression of boundaries through disability representation³³. In fact, Kristeva is concerned with disability in her work, which she calls the most "formidable of exclusions" among human beings³⁴.

There's something comforting when turning

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to Cohen's third thesis for disability analysis. The categories that we have created *can* and *are* violated by the monster, the abnormal and disabled body. The framework of society, in which communities set boundaries to define and articulate themselves, establishes abjection as a fundamental political experience. Abject experiences remind us that boundaries we use for identity, both personal and communal, are permeable and constructed rather than impermeable and permanent. The very presence of disability complicates our identities, of what we mean when we refer to the human. The concept of abjection can enhance our understanding of the monster genre's particular affinity with and connection to disabled imagery. The ambiguity in Cohen's second thesis plays with this categorical tension. The monster represents a threat but also releases and rejects the borders that created it.

There is a three-way division here between Cohen, Carroll, and Kristeva. It is absolutely correct to insist that the monster is the embodiment of crises—on the one hand, you have Carroll stating that the monster is the *physical embodiment* of this crisis. He argues that the monster breaches boundaries of the familiar, empirical, and conceivable. On the other hand, Kristeva states that the embodiment of the monster bears no causal relationship to the anxieties that they represent, and that their physiology is incidental. Kristeva here argues that any monster can stand in for the abjection they threaten and our relationship with the monster will stay constant. Cohen states that if monsters are a signifying system, then we must acknowledge that the monster signifier is never fully identical to the signified³⁵. There is always, as Cohen asserts, a difference between a monster and the anxieties it represents and embodies. There is always a difference between our categorization of the monster and the real threat that it signifies. The monster, as Carroll argues, is tied to categorical crises, but, as Kristeva argues, this connection is arbitrary. Monster films (and thus, disability representation) seem to understand this—the monster's defeat is frequently followed by a reassertion of danger: the monster is gone, but the threat of ideological crisis remains.

Thesis IV: The Monster Dwells at the Gates of Difference

In Cohen's fourth thesis, he states that the monster

is the physical embodiment of difference³⁶. As such, the monster simultaneously represents the beliefs and anxieties of the culture that created it as well as representing an "anterior culture" that justifies the attempted extermination of the monstrous identity³⁷. The monster is the explicit representation of binary thinking that situates "us" as the normal, non-disabled, white, heterosexual, male, and "them" as everything that does not fit into that normative identity.

The use of binary oppositions takes inspiration from Jacques Derrida. In his philosophy, the identity of a concept is given through conceptual relations to its opposite³⁸. Concepts like disability are not just to be studied as metaphors for given phenomena in the physical and social world but must be understood through the relation of ability and deviance through the relation of normality. The monster presents an interesting relational position—they do not exist to represent a specific difference, just all differences. Cohen states that "any kind of alterity can be inscribed across the monstrous body"³⁹ and it is often situated as inherently cultural, political, racial, economic, and sexual.

As disability is more integrated into discussions of race, class, and broader politics, the monster in popular culture works to justify disability's continued displacement or extermination. Monsters are not created randomly, but through the process of continual displacement, "fragmentation and recombination"⁴⁰. Marginalized members of society are assembled into one ubiquitous identity that is "the monster" and can claim "independent identity"⁴¹—but this identity erases any of the differences *within* the category of the monster.

Disability in film often represents not a point on the spectrum of identity; rather, it represents the lack of cultural identity. Without the monster, disability often signifies the inability to situate oneself within a culture. If we temporarily turn away from monsters, we can see how popular films about disability are often tied to narratives about finding one's place within a normative community, overcoming disability to return to a previous community or isolation from all communities. Popular disability-focused films such as *My Left Foot*⁴² and *The Theory of Everything*⁴³ tell inspirational stories of cultural integration while *I am Sam*⁴⁴ and *Forrest Gump*⁴⁵ attempt to portray the blurry existence of characters at the edge of society, and *Me Before You*⁴⁶ and

*The Sea Inside*⁴⁷ illustrate what occurs when a disabled character is incapable of integration.

The monster genre, then, posits an interesting contradiction to stereotypical representations of disability—perhaps the most crucial element of Cohen’s fourth thesis is the premise that the monster threatens to destroy “the very cultural apparatus through which individuality is constituted and allowed”⁴⁸. Since the monster demands to be read, the monster demands an explanation for its monstrousness. Through this examination of the *raison d’être* of the monstrous, any conclusion would highlight the arbitrariness of categorical figuration. David Lynch’s *The Elephant Man*⁴⁹ concludes with the monster being integrated into society and the townsfolk realizing his categorization as monstrous had been arbitrarily assigned. It is this response that signals the metaphor of monstrosity—a change from an investment in the aesthetics of the normative body to a gradual acceptance of bodily difference follows no cultural rules.

Cohen argues of a political-cultural monster. This monster is the embodiment of radical difference that threatens not to expose others’ differences, but to erase difference entirely⁵⁰. Disability representation is the antithesis to the normative culture, but it is a culture within itself—Cohen states that “political or ideological difference is as much a catalyst to monstrous representation on a micro level as cultural alterity in the macrocosm”⁵¹. Without compromising on its material reality, a greater emphasis on the performativity of the body and a recognition of disability as a constructed social category allows for the creation of a flexible matrix within which the multiplicity of experiences of embodiment can be examined in political and social contexts.

Thesis V: The Monster Polices the Borders of the Possible

Since the monster represents not the binary, but a separate third identity within the cultural climate, it forces all non-monstrous bodies to the social spaces defined by the binary—if a non-monstrous being exits the binary in search of freedom, it is rendered monstrous. Cohen states that “to step outside [the] official geography is to risk [becoming] monstrous oneself”⁵². Thus, the monster has two primary functions: first to describe how the monster came to be and second to highlight the use-value of

the monstrous body. The monster holds together the “system of relations we call culture”⁵³ to decide what border can and cannot be crossed.

Cohen’s fifth thesis serves to illustrate what Foucault calls the Panopticon. In works such as *Madness and Civilization*, *The Birth of the Clinic*, *Abnormal*, and *Discipline and Punish*⁵⁴, Foucault identifies key sites, such as the asylum, the courts, the prison, the clinic, and education facilities, that adopted shared techniques of disciplining abnormality. These techniques revolved around tools that labelled, partitioned, and scrutinized bodies to exact noncorporeal compliance. To accomplish this task, institutions increasingly looked to pathologizing professions, such as medicine, for expert testimony that could label the monstrous body into a body that behaved abnormally⁵⁵. Thus, Cohen’s fifth thesis shows the exact moment where the monster and disability coalesce into one entity.

The monstrous body serves to allegorically represent disability in popular culture because contemporary institutions (like film, literature, or television) still operate as historical remnants of outdated carceral regimes. The goal of the film is rarely to question the status quo, and “narrative film will always represent, at least symptomatically, the political unconscious of its historical moment”⁵⁶. Monster films typically seek out many of the cultural locations typically occupied by disabled people: prisons and hospitals being common narrative settings. Films such as *Halloween II*⁵⁷ and *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari*⁵⁸ take place in medical or psychiatric settings, while *30 Days of Night*⁵⁹, *Alien*⁶⁰, and *Prison*⁶¹ are set in prison-like atmospheres. Disability, like monsters, is still often portrayed in contained ways: we once again return to popular culture’s tendency to cure, kill, or exile disability in all forms in their rightful conclusions.

The monster exists because it provides a certain usefulness to the culture that created it. Carroll states that we consume monster films because they allow us to explore the uncrossable borders: beings that transgress the order of the universe as we understand it⁶². As such, monsters call into question the integrity and validity of order. Monsters are embodiments of the unknown/unknowable. They bring the unknown into the physical world.

The monster highlights areas of division within a culture. It explicitly tells us where its weaknesses are in political ideology, ethics, anatomy, or social construction. Thus, the monster also tells us

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directly where we need to turn to deconstruct a system—the monster’s “destructiveness [...] is a destructiveness: it threatens to reveal that difference originates in process, rather than in fact”⁶³. The monster embodies all that must be repressed, destroyed, or exiled—to defy any social norm is to become monstrous, instantly—but it also tells us of the possibilities of existence. To be a monster is to be free of hierarchy, and binary, and thus to be free of responsibility and expectations.

Thesis VI: Fear of the Monster is Really a Kind of Desire

The appeal of the monster is that it can awaken the experience of “mortality and corporality”⁶⁴—tying the abnormal body simultaneously to desire and fear allows audiences to confront what they are concerned is “monstrous” within themselves. The modern monster plays on the fear of one’s own body, and how one can control and relate to it. The monster presents both a temporary fear, but also an opportunity to inhabit existence beyond the rigid confines of cultural identity markers.

Cohen presents two overarching theories for why audiences are enticed by the monstrous: he first states that in order to encounter the monster and experience desire, audiences need to believe that they are physically safe from the monster’s harm⁶⁵. For example, while Seth Brundle commits terrifying acts in front of audiences’ eyes in David Cronenberg’s *The Fly*⁶⁶, audiences can derive pleasure from his narrative if they believe that the evil entity is physically distant from them and hence cannot cause harm to them. When he is killed in the final act of the film, his monstrous body cannot exit the screen to hurt the audience, and if he could, the experience would no longer be fun.

Our desire for the monster, thus, *may* come from a place of envy—the ability to temporarily inhabit an uninhibited body followed by the “re-entry into the world of comfort and light”⁶⁷. Popular culture monsters often present explicit allegorical representations of real-life marginalized identities—entities like Brundlefly, Godzilla, or Frankenstein do not exist in real life, but their cultural connotations do. Audiences can temporarily map their real experiences of marginalization onto the representations of the monstrous to feel validated. This is then followed by an exit into the real world where audiences

feel as though their fears are concluded; their desires can be fulfilled through a satisfying conclusion of a monstrous narrative that rids the community of the threat the monster brings.

Cohen also argues, however, that audiences need to feel a certain level of detachment—whether they can psychologically detach from a horror experience will control their ability to feel pleasure from that experience. Since the monstrous lurks somewhere in the ambiguous, uncategorizable space between fear and attraction, we can once again revisit Kristeva’s abjection. Encounters with the abject jeopardize personal and collective identity because they threaten the border of the subject and are accompanied by feelings of loss and loneliness. To escape the attraction of this dangerous otherness that is represented by disfigurement or decay—but still signifies the desired dissolution of bodily boundaries because of the continuing attraction to the abject—the individual must reject the abject to be able to define and defend the boundaries of identity. The abject is a “safeguard” of culture.

Cohen states that the monstrous body renders all identities valid and reveals their “partiality and contiguity”⁶⁸. While the monstrous resides in a place that is both dangerous and enticing, the monster is always present at moments of questioning ideological beliefs. Every “undesirable” quality of culture is mapped onto the monstrous body, working in contradictory ways to make it desirable for audiences that do not subscribe to the beliefs of bodily integrity. The scapegoated monster purges the community of its sins, functioning as an “exorcism” for cultural inequities⁶⁹.

Marginalized communities, like disabled people, often become victims of a “body aesthetic that defines some groups as ugly or fearsome and produces aversive reactions in relation to members of those groups”⁷⁰. Thus, the monstrous (disabled) body is *socially constructed* as a harbinger of fear and desire. We desire both its uncategorized existence and its temporality. Since the monster has been given the right to exist outside the binary, to act unpoliced, the monstrous body also attracts envy. The monster can freely exist outside of the rigid confines of the binary, and as such, it allures non-monstrous identities to the potential of existence.

Thesis VII: The Monster Stands at the Threshold ...of Becoming

In Cohen's final thesis, he states that monsters are no different from us⁷¹. While they purport to exist outside the binary, they reflect us in every possible way. They have the knowledge of the human experience and are aware of the cultural connotations that rendered them monstrous. We are incapable of escaping the reality where the culture that is trying to eradicate monsters is also the culture that created the necessary environment that fosters the monstrous.

The monster also tells us more about ourselves than it does about the Other. The cultural codes that we have tied to the monster—we tend to think of power dynamics, prejudices, and fears—are in fact representing the society that created the monster, and not the monster itself. To eradicate and ostracize people for their differences is ideology rearing its ugly head and not the fault of the monster themselves.

The essential zeitgeist of Cohen's final thesis is that the monster reflects the future. What we can expect as cultural codes and identity markers are tied up in the monster. Cohen states that "monsters are our children"⁷². They represent a population that is still becoming whole. Communities can only moderately prepare for the future their culture will foster, and monsters can help us prepare for the possibility of identities that will arise as a new generation enters the world. While the other theses represent what the monster threatens, his final thesis summarizes how these threats are not dangerous, but suggestive. They are threats we should lean into, accept, and seek out.

As our culture moves forward, the introduction of new and uncategorized identities is only expanding. Once dislodged from its material context and recognized as an allegorical representation, disability shows that it can shift and change, move and be moved from place to place, context to context. Hence, in Hollywood films, disability is a sliding signifier that transgresses many different boundaries, such as confinement and freedom, individuality and dependence, democracy, and autocracy. While transgressive symbols such as disability come into play when there is a social need or desire to make and maintain a border or boundary between objects, it also can foreshadow what to expect of a culture.

Director Guillermo del Toro, known for his love of monsters, commonly represents Cohen's final thesis by showing that what is so terrifying

about monsters is not their physical embodiment, but rather, the cultural codes that were right in front of viewers all along. What's terrifying about *The Shape of Water*⁷³ is not the amphibious creature, but that the creature is more capable of teaching us about love and beauty than the human race; and in *Pan's Labyrinth*⁷⁴, the horror is not Pan, or the Pale Man, but rather the political climate Ofelia escapes to encounter the monstrous instead.

In film, the disabled other is a bit too close to the "we," the "us." Where monster films once only allowed for disabled characters when there was the hope of rehabilitation and individualistic autonomy, we are moving into an era of representation where the monster can threaten and successfully dismantle these expectations. In this sense they are truly transgressive—that is, holding the possibility of crossing the boundary between us and them. To function as a sliding signifier, monsters must not be considered in their concrete and observable physical manifestation but in how they symbolize the entire field constituted by the term disability. In this sense, disability becomes what Thomson⁷⁵ refers to as the extraordinary body, that is, a figuration of the body that disrupts and disturbs the norm. Monsters operate in culture to create figures of otherness that allow space for previously excluded discourse.

Conclusion

Monster studies offer the revolutionary potential for identifying disability in the media in places where it was once ignored. While filmic representation is still not yet beyond the point of falling into the stereotypical tropes of disability, turning toward the monster genre for diverse and authentic representations of disability offers new and possibly optimistic ways of understanding the disabled experience. Not all monster films are made with care and attention to disabled livelihood, but the ones that are made with care show progress in disability inclusion beyond what any drama or biopic can currently offer. Cohen's theses offer representational studies of a future to look forward to. Disability through Cohen's monster exists both as a physical embodiment of difference, but also as a cultural allegory. By recognizing these modes of marginalized representation, we can map out a future of inclusion and acceptance that fosters the breaking down of boundaries and the withdrawal from categorical configuration.

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Notes

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- 9 Waititi, Taika and Jemaine Clement, directors. *What We Do in the Shadows*. Madman Entertainment, 2014. 85 minutes.
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- 43 Marsh, James, director. *The Theory of Everything*. Focus Features, 2014. 123 minutes.
- 44 Nelson, Jessie, director. *I Am Sam*. New Line Cinema, 2001. 132 minutes.
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