

Amy Falvey

# Always Already Post: On the Machineries of Buildings and Bodies

*My eyes are bi-focal  
My hands are sept-jointed  
I live in the future  
In my prewar apartment  
And I count all my blessings  
I have friends in high places  
And I'm upgraded daily  
All my wires without traces*

*Hooked into machine  
Hooked into machine  
Hooked into machine  
I'm Hooked into, Hooked into  
Hooked into machine  
Hooked into machine  
Hooked into machine  
I'm hooked into, hooked into machine*

*I collect my moments  
Into a correspondence  
With a mightier power  
Who just lacks my perspectives*

*And who lacks my organics  
And who covets my defects  
And I'm downloaded daily  
I am part of a composite*

*Hooked into machine  
Hooked into machine  
Hooked into machine  
I'm Hooked into, Hooked into  
Hooked into machine  
Hooked into machine  
Hooked into machine  
I'm hooked into, hooked into machine*

*Everything's provided  
Consummate consumer  
Part of worldly taking  
Apart from worldly troubles  
Living in your pre-war apartment  
Soon to be a postwar apartment  
And you live in the future  
And the future, it's here, it's bright, it's now  
-Regina Spektor, "Machine"<sup>1</sup>*

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Just as I was beginning to teach a summer literature course on dystopian fiction and posthuman bodies, singer and songwriter Regina Spektor released her 2009 album, *Far*. Coming across the track "Machine," the song eerily struck many chords. The depiction of the human/machine relationship in Spektor's song conveys a body much like

those "posthuman bodies" that have become an increasingly important investment within discourses of not only technology, but of identity and embodiment. This essay draws upon the philosophy that I argue is articulated in "Machine," and extends this philosophy to rethinking the ever reconfiguring bodies of geography and nation.

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Thus, this essay will weave in and out of different “bodies” and how such bodies are only ever “post.”

In a U.S. society that continues to proliferate its “posts,” it is unsurprising that with such proliferation comes an increasing suspicion of the implementation of such a wary prefix. The prefix presumes an aftermath, a foreclosure of past from present, and a bounded space and time. In an era in which postmodernism, postcolonialism, posthumanism and post-identity continue to raise significant questions about nations, identities, bodies, and violence, so too have arisen a clamor of voices decrying the (in)accuracies of suggesting that there is anything “post” about modernism, colonialism, humanism, or identity. “Post” problematically suggests a beyond-ness and an over-ness; a state or position that has long been hailed as the place reserved for the privileged (white, male, heteronormative) body, “post” connotes transcendence. While the tethers of modernism, humanism, colonialism, and identity have all but been loosened or unbound, it has been such “post” explorations that do not merely formulate a contained past and bracketed futurity – but work to re-read embodiments as they are striated and situated, marked within the fields of the social, historical, political, and economic. Though some imaginings of “postness” do suggest “overness” or “beyondness,” there are still many interrogations of “postness” that call for a re-framing of present understandings of the ways in which bodies are entangled in worlds, from which disentanglement is an impossibility. It is often through “posts” – and particularly, as I argue here, through investigating the “posthuman” body – that we can re-imagine bodies (individual, geographic, national) and argue that their created borders and their imagined purities are just that: created and imaginary. Posthumanism challenges the concept of transcendence altogether, and thus works to destroy modernist and humanist paradigms that insist on the possibility of stability and singularity of identity. The violence done in the name of transcendent or idealized “whole” bodies is thus exposed for what it is – a fantasy whose contours have very real and material effects in the world.

Posthumanism, a particularly pervasive term in recent years, has come under criticism as failing to address embodied subjects, who cannot

escape that embodiment to enter into the realm of the “post.” Yet this fails to address the aspects of posthumanism that very ardently work to destroy prevailing rhetoric which serves to justify or rationalize racist and heteronormative violence that persists in American society. Posthumanism works to dissect prevailing notions of “otherness” that insist on pure, whole, integrated bodies – notions that continually promulgate violence, colonization, racism, sexism, and homophobia in the name of saving that supposedly pure body from the infringement of “others.” Thus posthumanism does not rely solely on a concept of beyond-ness or past-ness of humanism. It works rather to challenge the grounds on which one comes to make such claims to (or of) other-ness, beyond-ness, transcendence.

Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston tell their readers that, “You’re not human until you’re posthuman. You were never human,”<sup>2</sup> and this is so because, as they state:

what comes after the human is not another stage of evolution but a difference in kind. How is your body changing in kind? In small ways: I had my ear pierced (the topology of my body is changing: there’s another hole all the way through it; my body is the earring of my earring). I got a tattoo (I participate in the cultural marking of my body). In other ways: it is changing its gender or its sexuality; that is, my sexual practices are re-configuring my body. I am becoming variously cyborgized (re-integrated with machine parts or across various networks). It is changing its dimensions, not by getting smaller or larger, but by being rhythmized across different sets of relations.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, theories of the posthuman necessarily deal with interminglings of “inside” and “out,” and challenge traditional understandings of selfhood and identity – in that identity can no longer be traced to locatable, isolatable origins; there is no nature extricable from culture, no culture isolatable from nature – no body removable from its multiplicitous contexts and connections. In the proposition of “posthuman bodies,” there is

a re-introduction, a re-reading, of how bodies and embodiment, are understood; the humanist, modernist dreams of unifying self and identity through transcendence are pulled back to the physics and physicality of the impulsivity and spontaneity – of body, of self, of identity – which is always already *becoming* – becoming other than itself, with its incessant “differences in kind” and unavoidable being-rhymed and being-rhythmed “across different sets of relations.” Any “structure” is only ever an ongoing entity of re-structuring, “form” ever only an ongoing shaping of negotiations between infinite shapes, which constantly re-form and re-shape one another. As N. Katherine Hayles has noted, “the posthuman should not be depicted as an apocalyptic break with the past.”<sup>4</sup> As this essay will demonstrate, the posthuman is only post because it was – is – always already post; such postness, then, negates any reliance on the transcendent, beyond, or over. Nostalgia and mourning for imagined moments of past purity and unification are re-conceived in the posthuman body – as an embrace of inner-alterities – of constant mutating and re-configuring bodies and identities. Eva Hayward comes to further understand her body through the body of a starfish, claiming the “re”-ness of her own body – the “re-generating” bounds of her body – unceasing re-configuration: “Re-grow, re-differentiate, re-pattern, re-member, re-nucleate: our bodily structures, our biodynamics, are materially enacted through ongoing relationships with the world, as part of that world.”<sup>5</sup> Posthuman bodies are always already regenerating, always already altering their dimensions. As this essay will argue, it is through posthuman philosophy, in part, that we can better understand the interdependence, inter(con)textualities and vulnerabilities of embodiment.

Concepts of pure and isolatable bodies have long permeated and governed the ways in which the relationships between bodies are comprehended. Often geographies or citizenships become bodies through language: there are bodies of water, bodies of land, national bodies. And how are these bodies demarcated from one another? Maps have lines and colors for water and land, parks and streets that separate one from the other. But standing at the shoreline of La Piedra, that “separates” the cerulean Pacific Ocean and the “state” of

California, the water moves in and out without a line ever, at any given moment, remaining stable. And the line that divides California from Nevada is always only a line which has been performed and reiterated; before the legislation and naming that accompanies the drawing up of lines, there was no “in” Nevada, and “out” of California. Like the “national body” of the United States, there was never an “in” and “out” before these lines were made. Of course, delineations between one place and the next, where one entity ends and another begins, is not unique to the borders between California and Nevada, nor to the shoreline between the oscillating edges of water and sand on the beach of La Piedra. And cartography is not the only means by which lines are made. In dominant rhetoric that centers around immigration in the United States, the national body of the U.S. is under threat, and “they” are taking over; in dominant religious rhetoric, homosexuality threatens to take over “our” nation and corrupt “its” ideals. In both these circumstances, there is a preordained being – a formulated entity which encompasses both the “us” and the “its” and is rightful owner (as well as suggesting a unitary and agreed-upon definition of “corruption” or “ideals”). The language that espouses such a formulated entity expresses a belief in a singular and definable owner, a singular and definable “body,” and insists, implicitly, that there were, or are, never any cartographers – that what is and who is the “United States” pre-existed the work of politics and governments, laws and language, colonization and cartography. Such language insists that there is a body with boundaries that pre-exist the enactment of those boundaries, and thus insist too on an originary pure and isolatable body.

Marita Sturken describes the “tourist of history,” as one who takes the position of “innocent,” and thus, the pure. She joins this concept with political economics:

Consumerism and paranoia are both responses to disempowerment and practices enabled by notions of innocence. They underlie the act of buying a Hummer in order to feel safe in one’s neighborhood while one’s country is at war across the globe for, among

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other things, an economy dependent on the overconsumption of oil. Commodity fetishism, which endows commodities with meaning that are disconnected from their production and economic effects, enables the purchase of a Hummer to be seen as a solitary act of home defense and comfort, rather than as a politically inflected consumer decision that impacts foreign policy and the environment. The effect is circular: the fetishizing of the Hummer as a vehicle that provides individual comfort and safety helps to create the insecure environment that produces the desire to purchase the Hummer to begin with.<sup>6</sup>


Sturken's use of the word innocence refers to American exceptionalism, and this pertains to her concept of the stance of the "tourist" of history, one who views America as somehow isolated from the ebbs and tides of global occurrences, histories, violences. The "tourist" takes a position of an innocent, as a body or entity disconnected from "others" – somehow outside interconnected and intermeshing relationships of politics and/or economics. The Hummer scenario Sturken describes is a way of articulating a particular relationship to history and the place of "America" within it. The consumer of the Hummer neglects the histories embedded within the creation of the product itself, and the political implications and consequences that are caught up in the matrix of its production and consumption. Like the innocent "tourist" of history, one who believes in the possibility of "purity" from "outside agents" refuses to acknowledge the interconnectedness of human bodies and "national bodies." The posthuman body, instead, acknowledges the inevitability of this connectedness.

### The Future Is Here & Now

Let us return, then, to the song "Machine," and the "variously cyborgized" body of Regina Spektor. As she tells it, she is "hooked into machine"; not "a" or "the" machine, but simply *hooked into machine*. The absence of an article here is not simply compliance with a rhythmic demand – especially coming from

an artist who can and does often fit all kinds of words into all kinds of unanticipated spaces. Although I am certain there are multiple meanings this absence might have (as often her work carries multiplicitous meanings and doublings), it is in some part lacking this article due to all her "wires without traces." With the addition of the "a" or "the" before "machine," we would be given some kind of wire, some kind of trace – an unnamed, yet identifiable, source. There would be some trace of connection between the "human" body and the "body" of ("a" or "the") machine – a place where one might locate the division or connection between human and machine, or some hierarchy that establishes where "human" and "machine" fall. But this is much more ambiguous.

Spektor's song states that she is both "upgraded daily" as well as "downloaded daily." To state that she is "upgraded daily" indicates that her body actually *is* machinery, technology. We upgrade cell phones, computers, cars, cable packages; she is an updating and upgrading piece of technology. The latter statement, that she is "downloaded daily," also deals with her body/self as machinery. The singer/songwriter, without doubt at present, does not go a day without being downloaded onto someone's computer, into someone's iPod; as songs and words that may be "hers," they are variously integrated into the machinery of production and consumption (iTunes, iPods, laptops), and her



Regina Spektor's *Far*

voice is over and over reproduced, in countless ways, in countless cars, through the speakers of countless computers. What of “Regina” herself is actually downloaded? There is no line drawn here, no attempt to resolve where “Regina” ends and begins. No attempt to resolve where “Regina” ends and “technology” begins, but only a reflection on how her body has not only become, but has always been, “variously cyborgized” – remember, “you were never human,” only ever posthuman.

The references to prewar and postwar apartments initially seem apocalyptic, an ominous tone of nuclear war-to-come, quickening in its approaching moments. But the “post” is always already in the present, as the future is “here” and “now.” So the before is always already the after and vice versa – there is no teleological arc of time. Additionally, it is likely that the singer/songwriter, who resides in New York City and writes of it often in her music, is referencing what are actually referred to as prewar and postwar apartment buildings in the city. Prewar apartments are reputed for their structural security – their higher quality of construction. Postwar apartments carry opposite connotations – cheaply or poorly constructed buildings, with less stability. The stability and endurance associated with these different structures is a most compelling aspect of such a reference. The lyrics to this song are most certainly about structures of living and being, in bodies that are “variously cyborgized” and thus, never stable. Even the illusion of a more stable and sturdy foundation (the “prewar apartment”) is always only that illusion, as it is already a postwar apartment (because the future is “here,” “now”). Or, if the speaker/singer indicates that the prewar apartment is to be destroyed in a forthcoming war, the disintegration of the stable structure is then still replaced by one that is perhaps less sturdy. But again, this is no timeline of progress or regression, as the disintegration is always already present (because, again, the prewar is always already the postwar; the future is “here,” “now”). Even in the case of a conversion – that following a war to come, or a war of the past (WWII particularly), a sturdy structure is to be torn down and rebuilt in a less reliable form, there is no linear timeline of stability to instability, or vice versa; there is simply change, a “difference in kind” which is both past, present,

and future all at once: you were never anything but “post.”

The body of the building, like the body of the speaker/singer, is always already disintegrating and reintegrating various parts. She tells us that she is “part of a composite” – part of an amalgamation of various compounds, part of something which is made of various elements. She is not part human, part machine; she is *hooked into machine*, no part by part, no half and half, but human machine and machinized human. There is no nostalgia or mourning for the prewar apartment, because it is always already postwar. There is no nostalgia or mourning for the prewar apartment, because it never existed. Regina’s machine/body is “part of a composite” – always already intertwining with various elements, compounds, organics and inorganics. In the words of Donna Haraway, “It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation between human and machine.”<sup>7</sup> Regina refuses to convey any nostalgia for structure and stability, as she conveys that this was always already a myth, always already implicit in interconnections with “foreign” material; there is always already radical alterity, impurity, and foreign-ness in her cyborgized, digitalized body. While the machine might, on the surface, appear to be a “mightier power,” it also “lacks” her “organics,” and it “covets” her “defects.” This “personification” elicits a “machine” which both emotes and desires, just as the “human” does. The body of Regina’s speaker (and/or Regina herself) is becoming, in such a way as Deleuze and Guattari convey it: “Becoming is like the machine: present in a different way in every assemblage, passing from one to the other, opening one onto the other, outside any fixed order or determined sequence.”<sup>8</sup> Elizabeth Grosz reflects on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the machine, and of assemblage:

In Deleuze and Guattari’s work, subject and object can no longer be understood as discrete entities or binary opposites. Things, material or psychological, can no longer be seen in terms of rigid boundaries, clear demarcations; nor, on an opposite track, can they be seen as inherently united, singular or holistic. Subject and object are series of flows, energies, movements,

strata, segments, organs, intensities – fragments capable of being linked together or severed in potentially infinite ways other than those which congeal them into identities [. . .] Assemblages or machines are heterogenous, disparate, discontinuous alignments or linkages brought together in conjunctions (x plus y plus z) or severed through disjunctions and breaks. But significantly, assemblage follows no central or hierarchical order, organization, or distribution; rather, it is, like the contraption or gadget, a conjunction of different elements on the same level.<sup>9</sup>

Like Deleuze and Guattari's assemblages, the various integrations and networks that form the body of Regina's speaker are not distinguishable hierarchies, akin to Haraway's statement reflecting the ambiguity of who makes and who is made in the relation between human and machine. Regina does not suggest that she acts on the machine any more than the machine acts on her body; through the personification of the machine, it becomes an actor as much as her own body is actor. There is no attempted edge forged between Regina and machine, there are no traces of pollution or impurity, as Regina is always already polluted and technologized. The speaker of "machine" makes no effort to shore up a line, to find a division at the edges of the flesh. The body is always a contradictory body, an amalgamating and mutating body, a technologized body and a body technologized – a machinized and invaded body, an always already "sick" and "infiltrated" body. Thus the "invaders" are never "invaders" in the individual body, and neither are they such in dominant political and social space; rather, the dominant social and political space is always already disrupted, infiltrated, reconfiguring. Opposing transcendent views of selfhood and identity, the "post" disrupts this Enlightenment or Modernist notion of selfhood as pure, as capable of being extricated visually or physically from the "flesh of the world"<sup>10</sup> – it argues against this humanist/modernist notion of the self as articulatable in some vacuum of autonomy.

## Drawing Dead Lines

This argument is not only invested in individual embodiment as posthuman, but also invested as such in the context of nationhood. "Postnation" is a term that has also come under critique. Frederick Buell writes that a significant element of conversations circulating about globalization "is the question of whether the era of the nation-state is coming to an end." Buell suggests that, "the demise of the nation has been greatly exaggerated," and that, "contemporary globalization has in fact not meant the withering away of nations and national cultures and the erasure of the constraints of political and even physical geography."<sup>11</sup> As Buell suggests, despite the popular acceptance and embrace of "globalization" as a phenomenon that busts borders, "the nation" is still very much conceived as a singular and definable entity. This is perhaps where thinking of the nation as "post" might be construed very differently: the concept of the "nation" is most certainly not a notion merely of the past – a notion society has "gone beyond" or "gotten over" – and, like discourses that cling to the extricable and isolatable human, most still comprehend (and rhetorically construct) "the nation" as an isolatable entity. Through posthumanism, we might argue that "nation" has always already been post, in that the illusion of a "whole" national "body" is a product of line-making and founded on a false sense of purity, stability, and wholeness; and that this "nation" is continually evoked (as is the stable and pure, whole "human" body) in order to maintain the appearance of "itself" as delineable, an articulation produced for the self-maintenance of the power invested in this imaginary "nation" and/or "body." As such, Buell's claim that "the constraints of political and even physical geography" have all but dissipated is emphatically true, and it is through theories such as posthumanism, which insist on the impossibility of pure bodies, that we can struggle to loosen such (often violent) constraints.

In the introduction to *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Sara Ahmed analyzes the language dynamics in a British National Front Poster, which reads: "Every day of every year, swarms of illegal immigrants and bogus asylum seekers invade Britain by any means available to them..."

Why? They are only seeking the easy comforts and free benefits in Soft Touch Britain. All funded by YOU – The British Taxpayer!”<sup>12</sup> The language of this poster is of course familiar to the discourse currently surrounding the issues of illegal immigration in the United States, and the rationale of the violated taxpayer is pervasive in argumentation on the subject. Ahmed argues that this false construction sets up both an imaginary “you,” an implicit imaginary “we,” and of course, an imaginary “other.”<sup>13</sup> Ahmed addresses the way in which this language asserts:

that the nation’s borders and defences are like skin; they are soft, weak, porous and easily shaped or even bruised by the proximity of others [. . .] To be a ‘soft touch nation’ is to be taken in by the bogus: to ‘take in’ is to be ‘taken in’ [. . .] The risk of being a ‘soft touch’ for the nation, and for the national subject, is not only the risk of becoming feminine, but also of becoming ‘less white,’ by allowing those who are recognized as racially other to penetrate the surface of the body.<sup>14</sup>

The risk/threat posed involves the penetration not just of the imagined national body, but of the surface of that imagined body. The threat to the surface, to the way in which a body “appears,” or “can be seen,” speaks to the emphasis of the visual in respect to the perception, and readability, of the imagined body. As with the individual body, one who perceives the imagined nation to be a formed and stable “subject” cuts it off from the actuality of the relations existing between that constructed nation and its constructed others; one who perceives the imagined national body to be a determinable and identifiable real body must construct and then ward off those constructed others in order to create a concept of a formulated self to begin with. Surfaces are the “place” in which these imaginary concepts are articulated and endowed with power – the borderlines drawn between spaces on maps, making space and place chartable, delineable, readable. City limits, state lines, customs checkpoints, air and maritime regulations: these are not just designations of property, but articulations of formed and stable

“selves” – readable surfaces and identifiable places of the limits of an imagined “body.”

On Talk Radio Network’s *The Savage Nation*, Michael Savage stated that “America is being overrun by an invasion force from Mexico that’ll soon take over the country [. . .] And minorities in America are becoming the majority.”<sup>15</sup> Savage clearly sees illegal immigration as something which is threatening to consume the dominant “face” of the nation (the minority will eat up the majority, taking the place of the majority). Savage continues: “If you look at the countries around the world where most of these immigrants have come from, you will see autocratic regimes, you will see drug dealers running the nation, you will see people living like serfs, and you will see the future face of America.” The “surface”/the “face” of America, in the “logic” of such rhetoric, is threatened, endangered, by the “taking over” of majority by minority, and the “face” of such a nation is non-white, which must then be the impure, non-white immigrant. Ahmed discusses an excerpt from the Aryan Nations’ Website, which claims that their disgust, for example, with looking on mixed-raced couples, or frustrations with immigrants getting jobs “over the white citizens who built this land,” is not out of hate: “No, it is not hate. It is Love.”<sup>16</sup> The language of the Aryan Nations’ Website is strikingly similar to the rhetorical framework Savage utilizes; Savage asks, “Is it racist to love your nation? Is it racist to protect your nation? Is it racist to protect your nation against an invading horde, from another nation that wants to sweep you off the map?”<sup>17</sup> Like the language analyzed by Ahmed, Savage generates a pure and holistic subject, and makes a (false) claim to ownership over what America is (white) and who is being violated by whom (disavowing his own privileged position, as white male American citizen) by suggesting that it is actually he who suffers a threat, victimhood; something is being taken from him which presumably belongs to him (and others like him, whites, or “non-immigrants”), and it is he who experiences violation, he who is under the threat of consumption. He claims that non-U.S. nations are aiming to “sweep” him “off the map.” This threat of disintegration, literal disappearance from the map, the vanishing/extinguishing of the U.S., and the power of the white heterosexual male American body, is also under threat.


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I recently read a number of blogs responding to a 2008 *Las Vegas Sun* article about illegal immigration. One blogger stated that this isn't "America anymore, it is something else and it is just a huge mess."<sup>18</sup> Here America is called upon as an entity which was once a readable, legible, distinguishable "surface"; but now, in such rhetoric, it has become "a huge mess." It is no longer the (imagined) readable surface it once was (at some imagined past moment of unification); it has become illegible – "something else" without a given name, other than its designation as a mess. Michael Beehler writes that:

The simple economy of the border – the secure differentiation of the inside from the outside, the same from the other – is always complicated by the illegal alien who can be neither legally internalized nor legally externalized. Beyond the control of the institutional law, the illegal alien disturbs the border, overrunning it in a gesture that marks the border as the site of an inevitable instability and insecurity.<sup>19</sup>

In this sense, illegal aliens represent the abject; in wishing to conceive of itself (and disseminate itself) as a "clean and proper body," institutional forces desire the riddance of the illegal alien, who seeps through the lines constructed to maintain a pure and whole, coherent "self." Perhaps for these reasons, we see some of the most hostile rhetoric conjured around the figure of the illegal immigrant. In response to the figure of the "illegal alien," which calls into question the borders of a legible body, those who claim ownership, singularity, and readability of a "national body" wish to expel the inner-alterity that threatens the perseverance of an imagined whole, delineable (cleanly, clearly bordered) entity. Steven Shaviro writes:

We are all tainted with viral origins, because life itself is commanded and impelled by something alien to life. The life possessed by a cell, and all the more so by a multicellular organism, is finally only its ability to carry out the orders transmitted to it by DNA and RNA. It



A T4 bacteriophage virus, which is only one example of many types of DNA virus, attaches to a cell and injects its genetic material – its DNA – into a host cell. Image courtesy of Paul Jablonka.

scarcely matters whether these orders originate from a virus, or from what we conceive as the cell's own nucleus. For this distinction is only a matter of practical convenience. It is impossible actually to isolate the organism in a state before it has been infiltrated by viruses, or altered by mutation; we cannot separate out the different segments of DNA, and determine which are intrinsic to the organism and which are foreign.<sup>20</sup>

Like Shaviro's description of the impossible dividing lines between intrinsic and foreign, alien or natural, the "organism" that is not only the body, but the national "body" bears the same impossibly pure moments of isolation from "infiltration" and "mutation." Philosophies of the posthuman body help us to better understand national and geographic bodies, and their inextricable relationship to and with "others." Spektor's "machine" presents us with a body not disconnected, not hierarchized in relationship to technology. Which is "foreign" – the "human" or "machine" – is not determinable with any degree of certainty; there are multiple openings, and no longing or nostalgia for the "prewar." Perhaps reflections on the posthuman – and/or reflections on how our bodies are reconfiguring across various

machinic networks – can help us to understand geographic and national relationships more fully. Perhaps in investigating such connections, we can reconfigure more malleable cartographies that do not forcibly and violently coerce the drawing of dead lines.

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### End Notes

1 Regina Spektor, "Machine" *Far* (CD Sire/London/Rhino Records: 2009).

2 Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, *Posthuman Bodies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 8.

3 *Ibid.*, 18.

4 N. Katherine Hayles, "Afterword: The Human in the Posthuman," *Cultural Critique* No. 53, Posthumanism (Winter, 2003), 134.

5 Eva Hayward, "More Lessons from a Starfish: Prefixial Flesh and Transspeciated Selves" *WSQ: Women's Studies Quarterly* Volume 36, No. 3 & 4, Fall/Winter 2008, 76.

6 Marita Sturken, *Tourists of History: Memory, Kitsch, and Consumerism from Oklahoma City to Ground Zero* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 41.

7 Donna Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 177.

8 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Trans. Brian Massumi. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 347.

9 Elizabeth Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 167.

10 See Marice Merleau-Ponty's essay "The Intertwining – The Chiasm," *Visible and the Invisible*, Trans. Alphonso Lingis (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1969). Merleau-Ponty states that, "once a body-world relationship is recognized, there is a ramification of my body and a ramification of the world and a correspondence between its inside and my outside, between my inside and its outside," and asks, "Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the world is flesh?" (136)

11 Frederick Buell, "National Postnationalism: Globalist Discourse in Contemporary American Culture" *American Quarterly* Volume 50, Number 3, September 1998, 550.

12 Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1.

13 Ahmed suggests that narratives of penetration or invasion, "work by generating a subject that is endangered by imagined others whose proximity threatens not only to take something away from the subject (jobs, security, wealth), but to take the place of the subject" (*The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, 43). This pertains to the created concept of pure and whole bodies, as it is only in the imaginary that such subjects or others can be created; and it is also only through the disavowal of one's own position of power that this is rhetorically possible. Marita Sturken's discussion of narratives of paranoia is also helpful to look at in this context. She writes: "Security as acquisition has also been closely allied with the image of the United States as virtuous and pristine in relation to other nations. Campbell states, 'The ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American experience.' Often this has been expressed as a form of paranoia: a powerful nation-state feeling continually under threat (disavowing its own power), seeing danger everywhere. This sense of danger was powerfully manifested during the cold war, when the Soviet Union was a compelling enemy against which fervent forms of patriotism were created. Yet the cold war was not exceptional; that guiding sense of danger, which preceded and has outlasted it, simply crystallized during that time" (*Tourists of History* 39).

14 Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, 2-3.

15 This commentary by Michael Savage took place on his radio program *Savage Nation* on August 14, 2008. The transcripts of this commentary are available at <http://mediamatters.org/research/200808180003>. (accessed July 19, 2009).

16 Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, 42.

17 See note 15.

18 Blog written in response to the article "Immigrants Boost Economy – But How Much?" by Timothy Pratt, *Las Vegas Sun* April 14, 2008. <http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/apr/14/immigrants-boost-economy-how-much/>. (accessed on July 2, 2009).

19 Michael Bechler "Border Patriots," *Aliens: The Anthropology of Science Fiction*, Eds. George E. Slusser and Eric S. Rabkin (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 27.

20 Steven Shaviro, "Two Lessons from Burroughs," *Posthuman Bodies*, Eds. Judith Halberstam, Ira Livingston (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 41.